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Abstract
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market
demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We …rst derive
the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who
assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary
processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research
or refrain from it depending on the di¤erence in pro…ts of informed and uninformed
sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss
how it is in‡uenced by market parameters.
JEL classi…cation numbers: C72, D43, D82
Keywords: oligopoly, market research, private information, evolution
1. Introduction
The role of information has been often studied in two–stage models assuming risk
neutral agents (see, e.g., Ponssard (1979), Li et al. (1987), Vives (1988), Ockenfels
(1989), Chang and Lee (1992), Daughety and Reinganum (1994), Hwang (1993, 1995)).
In these models the decisions to acquire information (taken at the …rst stage) are
common knowledge when agents take other actions (e.g., quantities, prices, etc.) at the
second stage. More recently, Hauk and Hurkens (in press) study information acquisition
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in a one–stage game (in the context of an oligopolistic market with uncertain demand)
and show that relative to the two–stage game …rms acquire less information.1
If market demand is stochastic, the decision whether or not to engage in active
market research may crucially depend on the degree of risk aversion. Therefore, in
our study we allow sellers to be risk averse. However, a simplifying assumption of our
model is that market research signals market demand perfectly, i.e. in case of market
research no ambiguity of market demand remains. Thus the sellers on the market
either know the market demand function, we name them informed sellers, or only the a
priori-probabilities of demand conditions. We refer to the latter sellers as uninformed
sellers.
In the tradition of Ponssard (1979), who assumed risk neutral sellers, we …rst de-
scribe a homogeneous oligopoly market with linear demand and linear production costs.
Di¤erent demand conditions correspond to parallel shifts of the demand curve. For a
given parameter ® of risk aversion we derive the market results for arbitrary numbers
m of informed sellers among the n sellers on the market, 0 · m · n.
With these result we then derive the pro…ts of informed and uninformed sellers as
well as their di¤erence. All these variables are, of course, stochastic. They allow us to
formulate an evolutionary process determining the number of informed sellers which is
governed by the di¤erence in pro…ts of informed and uninformed sellers (as well as by
a small probability " of mutation).
Our evolutionary analysis …rst concentrates on the deterministic border case where
sellers interact in…nitely often with each time newly drawn market demand before being
able to adapt their market research decision. Due to the in…nite number of interactions
with newly and randomly generated demand conditions, the di¤erence in pro…ts of
informed and uninformed sellers is that one for the mean demand curve with 0-variance.
Thus in case of no unintended mutation the evolutionary process is deterministic.
The other extreme assumption, which we consider, is just one interaction before
adapting market research individually. To illustrate how to analyse the stochastic
evolutionary process we focus on the simple case of just two sellers and derive the
1Due to the terminology introduced in Levine and Ponssard (1977) one distinguishes between private
information acquisition (two–stage game) and secret information acquisition (one–stage game).
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stationary distribution over the various numbers m = 0; 1; or 2 of informed sellers
on the 2–seller market. The speci…c results allow us to discuss how the distribution
depends on market parameters, especially on the parameter ® of risk aversion and on
the cost C of market research. The …nal remarks summarize our …ndings and discuss
possible generalizations.
2. The market model
The market model is based on Ponssard (1979) who studied the interaction of sellers
on a homogeneous market with stochastic demand where some sellers i = 1; :::;m
know and other sellers j = m + 1; :::; n do not know the exact demand condition.
One possible interpretation of such information discrepancy is that the informed sellers
are the market incumbents whereas the market entrants are the uninformed traders.
Here, however, we assume that all n(¸ 2) sellers are market incumbents who evolve as
informed or uninformed sellers depending on past success.
Compared to Ponssard (1979) we introduce a new reason for acquiring better in-
formation about market demand, namely risk aversion. It is assumed that all n sellers
i = 1; :::; n have cardinal utilities which can be expressed in the form
ui = E f¦ig ¡ ®2 V f¦ig for i = 1; :::; n (2.1)
where ¦i denotes seller i’s pro…t, E f¢g the expectation and V f¢g the variance
operator. The non-negative parameter ® measures the degree of risk aversion. If ® is
positive, seller i is risk averse. In Ponssard (1979) the ®-parameter of sellers i = 1; :::; n
was assumed to be 0.
Let xi (¸ 0) denote seller i’s sales amount and
X = x1 + ::: + xn (2.2)
the total market supply. The price p resulting for X is a stochastic variable accord-
ing to
p = D ¡ aX (2.3)
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where a is a positive parameter and D a stochastic variable with realizations d in
the range
d ¸ d ¸ d with d > d: (2.4)
Production costs are assumed to be linear and identical for all sellers i = 1; :::; n.
We denote by c with
d ¸ c ¸ 0 (2.5)
the constant marginal costs of all sellers.2
A seller, who did not invest in market research and does not know the realization
d of D, has no other cost. The pro…t of an uninformed seller j = m + 1; :::; n is thus
¦j = (d ¡ c ¡ aX)xj : (2.6)
Since such a seller j does not know d; he can only maximize his expected utility as
described by equation (2.1).
An informed seller i who knows the realization d of D when choosing xi, has addi-
tional cost C (> 0) of information acquisition, i.e. seller i = 1; :::; m will maximize
¦i = (d ¡ c ¡ aX)xi ¡ C: (2.7)
The continuous distribution ' (d) over the interval
h
d; d
i
satisfying (2.4) and (2.5)
is commonly known. We will rely on the shorthand ¹ = E fDg and ¾2 (m) = V
³
D
m+1
´
.
Clearly ¹ must satisfy d ¸ ¹ ¸ d. Since an uninformed seller j only knows the a priori-
expectation ' (¢) of D his strategy is simply his sales amount xj. An informed seller
i can react to actual demand, described by d, i.e. a strategy of such seller i assigns a
sales amount xi (d) to all possible realizations d of D.
In the next section we solve this market model for any number m of informed sellers
i with 0 · m · n. These results then allow us to investigate how risk aversion will
in‡uence information acquisition and the actual market results.
2 If c >d would hold, sellers might prefer to not sell at all what could lead to monopolistic behavior
which we want to rule out.
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3. The solution for given information conditions
For any informed seller i the optimal decision must satisfy
ax¤i (d) = d ¡ c ¡ aX (3.1)
in view of equation (2.7). Thus all m informed sellers i supply the same amount
x¤ (d) = x¤i (d) for all realizations d of D: (3.2)
An uninformed seller j maximizes
E f(D ¡ c ¡ aX)xjg ¡ ®2 V f(D ¡ c ¡ aX)xjg (3.3)
or
dZ
d
(d ¡ c ¡ aX)xjd' (d) ¡ ®2
dZ
d
[(d ¡ aX)xj]2 d' (d) + ®2
264 dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)xjd' (d)
375
2
:
(3.4)
From the …rst order condition one obtains
dZ
d
(d ¡ c ¡ aX ¡ axj) d' (d)
= ®
dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)xj (d ¡ aX ¡ axj) d' (d) (3.5)
¡®
264 dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)xjd' (d)
375 dZ
d
(d ¡ aX ¡ axj)d' (d)
for all n ¡ m uninformed sellers j = m + 1; :::; n. Rearranging (3.5) according to
dZ
d
(d ¡ c ¡ aX)d' (d) =
5
= xj
264a + ®
0B@ dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)2 d' (d) ¡ axj
dZ
d
(d ¡ aX) d' (d) (3.6)
¡
0B@ dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)d' (d)
1CA
2
+ axj
dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)d' (d)
1CCA
3775
= xj
2664a + ® dZ
d
(d ¡ aX)2 d' (d) ¡ ®
0B@ dZ
d
(d ¡ aX) d' (d)
1CA
2
3775
implies that
x¤j = x¤ for all uninformed sellers j = m + 1; :::; n (3.7)
must hold. Because of (3.1) and (3.2) we can thus express x¤i (d) by
ax¤i (d) =
d ¡ c
m + 1
¡ an ¡ m
m + 1
x¤: (3.8)
After inserting (3.7) and (3.8) equation (3.6) becomes an equation with one unknown
x¤ whose solution is
x¤ = ¹ ¡ c
(n + 1)a + ® (m + 1)¾2 (m)
: (3.9)
Inserting (3.9) into (3.8) …nally yields
x¤ (d) = d ¡ c
(m + 1) a
¡ n ¡ m
m + 1
¹ ¡ c
(n + 1)a + ® (m + 1)¾2 (m)
: (3.10)
Thus the a priori expected sales amount of informed sellers i is
x¤ :=
dZ
d
x¤ (d) d' (d) = (¹ ¡ c)
· 1
(m + 1)a
¡ (n ¡ m) = (m + 1)
(n + 1)a + ® (m + 1)¾2 (m)
¸
: (3.11)
For ® = 0 one has
x¤ = ¹ ¡ c
(n + 1) a
= x¤: (3.12)
Whereas x¤ increases, the amount x¤ decreases with a growing parameter ®. Thus,
the market will be more dominated by the m informed sellers i when the uninformed
sellers are more risk averse, i.e. for high values of ®. Whether, however, this will increase
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the number m of informed sellers i may very well depend on the cost C of information
acquisition. Moreover, let X¤(®) = mx¤+ (n ¡ m)x¤ be the expected industry output.
Since @X
¤(®)
@® = ¡¾2(m) (¹ ¡ c) (n ¡ m)=
¡
a(n + 1) + ®¾2(m)(m + 1)
¢2 < 0 for m < n;
the market is less e¢cient for greater ® when not all sellers are informed.
How risk aversion as expressed by ® > 0 and the cost C of information acquisition
together in‡uence the success and thus the future number m of informed traders on
the market with a constant number n of sellers will be explored next.
4. The incentives for market research
The incentive for market research is what an informed seller earns more than an unin-
formed seller when disregarding the cost C of market research. Let us …rst investigate
how the incentives for market research depend on market parameters, especially on the
number m of informed sellers and on the parameter ® of risk aversion. To do so we
…rst compare the a priori expected payo¤
ui = E f¦¤i (m; ®; d;C = 0)g ¡ ®2 V f¦
¤
i (m; ®; d;C = 0)g
of an informed seller i with the expected payo¤
uj = E
n
¦¤j (m;®; d)
o
¡ ®
2
V
n
¦¤j(m; ®; d)
o
of an uninformed seller j where ¦¤k(¢) indicates that we rely on optimal decisions as
derived above. For the sake of simplicity assume [d; d] = [0; 1] and a uniform density
'(¢) over [0; 1] so that ¹ = 12 and ¾2(m) = 1=12(m + 1)2:
Even for such simplifying assumptions the di¤erence ui ¡ uj is a rather clumsy
expression of market parameters which is, however, surely positive. An easy way for
investigating how ui ¡ uj depends on m is to consider m as a continuous variable and
to explore the derivative of ui¡uj with respect to m whose value ¡2¾2(m)=(m+1) for
® = 0 is negative, i.e. the incentive for market research decreases with an increasing
number m of informed sellers for small values of ®.
According to Ponssard (1979, Theorem 2), the fact that ui ¡ uj decreases with m
does not depend on the number n of sellers on the market. Does this invariance still
7
hold when sellers are risk averse, i.e. when ® is positive? The question can be answered
by evaluating the derivative of ui + C ¡ uj with respect to ® at ® = 0 what yields
@
@®
(ui + C ¡ uj)
¯¯¯¯
®=0
= ¡ 1
1440a2
4n2 + 8n + 15m2 + 30m + 19
(m + 1)4 (n + 1)2
< 0:
The larger n the less reactive is ui + C ¡ uj to changes of ® at ® = 0: Thus
risk aversion, i.e. a positive parameter ®, implies a negative relationship between the
incentive ui + C ¡ uj for market research and the number n of sellers on the market.
In other words, the invariance result of Ponssard (1979) holds only for the special case
® = 0:
At …rst sight it appears counter-intuitive that @@®(ui+C¡uj) depends negatively on
® in a neighbourhood of 0: One would have naturally expected that risk aversion inspires
engaging in market research, i.e. that a larger ® implies larger incentives ui + C ¡ uj
for market research. The puzzling e¤ect is due to the de…nition of ui + C ¡ uj as the
di¤erence of the a priori expected payo¤ ui + C of an informed seller i = 1; 2; :::;m
and the actually expected payo¤ uj of an uninformed seller j = m + 1; :::; n. Since
an informed seller i does not face any uncertainty, allowing for risk aversion, as in the
de…nition of ui in equation (2.1), is misleading.3 To determine the incentive for market
research one therefore should explore the derivative of
E f¦¤i (m;®; d; C = 0)g ¡ uj
with respect to ®: Since
@
@®
(E f¦¤i (m;®; d; C = 0)g ¡ uj)
¯¯¯¯
®=0
=
1
32a2 (m + 1)2 (n + 1)2
> 0;
our intuition is con…rmed: Risk aversion, i.e. a positive parameter ®, increases the
incentive for market research. Note, furthermore, that
@
@m
(E f¦¤i (m;®; d; C = 0)g ¡ uj)
¯¯¯¯
®=0
= ¡ 1
6a (m + 1)3
< 0;
i.e., as above, the incentive for market research decreases with an increasing number m
of informed sellers.
3Both approaches can, however, be justi…ed by appropriate decision processes. The incentive above
would rely on a stochastic game where all sellers face initially the same uncertainty. The other in-
terpretation of private information assumes that this chance move is purely …ctitious so that a priori-
expectations of informed sellers do not make sense.
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5. On the evolution of m
For any m with 0 < m < n and any realization d of the stochastic variable D let
¦¤j (m; ®; d) = [d ¡ c ¡ amx¤ (d) ¡ a (n ¡ m)x¤] x¤ (5.1)
and
¦¤i (m;®; d; C) = [d ¡ c ¡ amx¤ (d) ¡ a (n ¡ m)x¤] x¤ (d) ¡ C (5.2)
denote the realized pro…ts of the n ¡ m uninformed sellers j, respectively of the m
informed sellers i. The evolution of m is supposed to depend on the di¤erence
4 (m; ®; d; c) = ¦¤j (m; ®; d) ¡ ¦¤i (m; ®; d;C) (5.3)
of these two payo¤s.4 If 4 (m;®; d; C) is positive, one naturally will expect the num-
ber m of informed sellers i to decrease whereas m should increase when 4 (m; ®; d; C) is
negative. As ¦¤j (m;®; d) and ¦¤i (m; ®; d;C) also 4 (m;®; d; C) is a stochastic variable.
Before investigating the stochastic evolutionary process of m let us …rst consider
the border case where the n sellers interact in…nitely often on the market where after
each interaction d is (independently and identically) randomly chosen according to ' (¢).
Only after experiencing an in…nite number of interactions with each time independently
chosen d, but with a constant composition of the market by m informed and n ¡ m
uninformed sellers, adjustment of market research, i.e. a change of m can take place.
Since ¦¤j (¢) depends linearly on d (see equation (5.1 above), this means that we just
have to consider the value of ¦¤j (¢) for d = ¹: On the other hand ¦¤i (¢) depends
quadratically on d (see equation (5.2)) so that its expected value will also depend on
the variance of D: The results can be illustrated in the m; ®-diagram of Figure 5.1
where we rely on the parameter constellation
a = 1; c = 0; d = 0; d = 1; n = 10; ¹ =
1
2
and ¾2(m) =
1
12(m + 1)2
: (5.4)
4This means that we distinguish between payo¤ (the cardinal utility of a seller), governing his market
behavior, and (reproductive) success (pro…t) on which the di¤usion of his information type (informed
versus uninformed) depends.
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Figure 5.1: The dynamics of m
Whereas above the 4 (m;®;¹;C) = 0-curves the number m of informed sellers i
increases, below these curves m tends to decrease. This shows that constellations m¤
such that
4 (m¤; ®; ¹;C) = 0 (5.5)
are the candidates for an evolutionarily stable number m of informed sellers i. Of
course, m¤ will usually not be an integer so that m may cycle around such non-integer
values m¤. Such minor changes seem, however, of little relevance and will therefore be
neglected. Note that in our numerical example presented in Figure 5.1, for high costs
for market research, e.g. C = :05; no seller will gather information if the parameter
of risk aversion ® is below 500: On the other hand when the costs for market research
are low, e.g. C = :0015; the number of informed sellers varies between 6 and 10 for ®
varying between 0 and 1000.
Let us now explore the actual stochastic process when assuming that a positive
value of 4 (¢) leads more or less surely to becoming an informed type whereas the
tendency is reversed for 4 (¢) < 0: Let the probability by which an uninformed seller j
switches to market research at cost C, respectively by which an informed seller i gives
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up market research be determined as
(1 ¡ ")P+ (m;®;C) = (1 ¡ ")Prob f4 (m;®; d; C) > 0g ; (5.6)
respectively
(1 ¡ ")P¡ (m;®;C) = (1 ¡ ")Prob f4 (m;®; d; C) < 0g : (5.7)
Here " with 0 < " < 1 is the (unintended and therefore typically small) mutation
probability.
For given " these two probabilities de…ne a stochastic Markov-process whose sta-
tionary distributions ¾ = (¾0; :::; ¾n) with
¾T = ¾ (5.8)
specifying the probabilities ¾m for the possible values of m in the long run. Here
T = (tk;l) denotes the transition matrix specifying for each number mt = k of informed
sellers in period t with 0 · mt · n how likely the result mt+1 = l is for the following
period t + 1. To de…ne T also for the border cases mt = 0 and mt = n let for
mt = 0 a seller j switch to market research with the small (unintended) mutation
probability "2 (> 0) : Correspondingly, for mt = n the switch of an informed seller i to
no market research occurs with the same mutation probability "2 . In the next section
we will illustrate the evolutionary stable distributions ¾, de…ned in (5.8), for the special
situation n = 2 with three possible realisations of m, namely m = 0; 1; and 2.
5.1. An example
As in oligopoly theory where the duopoly market is used as the paradigm of interaction
of …nitely many strategically interacting sellers the case n = 2 here serves as the
paradigmatic case of truly stochastic evolution on …nite markets. In the special case
n = 2 (neglecting the null-event 4 (¢) = 0) the transition matrix T is given by
T =
0BBB@
(1 ¡ "2)2 2(1 ¡ "2) "2
¡ "
2
¢2¡ "
2 + (1 ¡ ")P
¢2 2 ¡ "2 + (1 ¡ ")P ¢ ¡ "2 + (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ P )¢ ¡ "2 + (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ P )¢2¡ "
2
¢2 2(1 ¡ "2) "2 (1 ¡ "2)2
1CCCA
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where P = P+ (1; ®;C) : Here tk;l (k; l = 0; 1; 2) is the probability that the system
switches from mt = k at time t to mt+1 = l at time t + 1: For example, if mt = 0
then with probability 1 ¡ "2 a buyer simply keeps his type and with probability "2 he
unintendedly mutates to an informed seller. Since the random moves are stochastically
independent across sellers we have for example t0;0 = (1 ¡ "2)2:
For n = 2 the solution of equation (5.8) is given by
¾0(") =
1
4
2P"(1 ¡ ") + 4P 2(1 ¡ ")2 + "
2P (P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ")2 + 1 ;
¾1(") =
1
2
(2 ¡ ") "
2P (" ¡ 1)2 (P ¡ 1) + 1 ;
¾2(") =
1
4
4P 2(1 ¡ ")2 + 2P (7" ¡ 3"2 ¡ 4) + "(2" ¡ 5) + 4
2P (" ¡ 1)2 (P ¡ 1) + 1 :
Moreover, some computations show that
P+(1; ®;C) =
8<: 1 if 14
15552+®(576+®)
(288+®)2 < C <
1
4
2± ¡ 1 if C < 14 15552+®(576+®)(288+®)2
where ± = 96288+®
Ã
3
2 +
r
9
16 + 4C
³
3 + 196®
´2!
:
Thus for a positive, although small mutation probability " all three states m = 0; 1;
and 2 will be reached with positive probability according to the stationary distribution
¾ = (¾0; ¾1; ¾2): Furthermore, one has
lim
"!0¾0(") =
P 2
1 ¡ 2P + 2P 2 ; lim"!0¾1(") = 0; and lim"!0¾2(") =
1 ¡ P 2
1 ¡ 2P + 2P 2 ;
so that the bimorphic population consisting of one informed and one uninformed
seller is not represented in the limit distribution ¾ = lim"!0 ¾("). Note that ¾0 > ¾2
i¤ P > 12 :
Figure 5.2 displays for various values of the cost parameter C for market research
how the components of the stationary distribution ¾ vary with a growing parameter
® of risk aversion. (In these simulations the mutation rate is " = :001:)5 In all these
5Other simulations have shown that the composition of the stationary distribution hardly reacts to
the parameter ":
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Figure 5.2: Stationary distributions for varying ®:
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simulations the component ¾1 indicating the bimorphic population is virtually zero.
Therefore, the other two lines indicating the monomorphic populations are mirror im-
ages to each other.
A similar analysis for …nite numbers n > 2 of sellers on the market as for n = 2
would just require more complex calculations. Especially the result lim"!0 ¾1(") for
n = 2 should generalize to lim"!0 ¾m(") for all 0 < m < n for n ¸ 3 for the same
reason, namely the instability of bimorphism, as for n = 2:
6. Discussion
Starting from the oligopoly market with informed and uninformed sellers, as studied
by Ponssard (1979), we have shown
² that some of his results, like the invariance of ui + C ¡ uj with respect to the
number n of …rms in the market, does not hold for risk averse sellers,
² that more risk aversion decreases ui+C¡uj; but not E f¦¤i (m;®; d; C = 0)g¡uj;
and
² how such results allow us to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of m; i.e. the
composition of the market by informed and uninformed traders.
In our evolutionary analysis we have mainly concentrated on two border cases,
namely
² the one of in…nitely many interactions before an m-adjustment implying deter-
ministic evolutionary dynamics (except for the e¤ect of rare random mutation)
and
² the special case of just two sellers as the paradigmatic situation of …nitely many
sellers on the same market where the evolutionary dynamics are stochastic and
where the stationary solution for positive mutation rates depends in a rather
complex way on the various parameters.
Whereas most applications of indirect evolution focus on endogenous preference
formation, we thus have illustrated how other aspects like the information conditions of
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the various sellers can be endogenously derived. In our study a seller either is completely
aware of market demand or just knows the distribution by which market demand is
randomly determined (see Güth (1998) for a study of arbitrary belief evolution in case
of a deterministic market).
Altogether such studies of indirect evolution can help to overcome the fundamental
dilemma of industrial economics that nearly all market results can be justi…ed by a
rational choice approach. If some rules, like who is informed about market demand
and who not, cannot be endogenously derived, this can increase tremendously the
cutting power of our theoretical predictions.6 As an example we can point to the fact
that low mutation rates render bimorphic markets very unlikely, i.e. in the long run all
sellers will either be uniformly aware or unaware of market demand.
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